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DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS: WHY 
GRANTING DRIVER’S LICENSES TO DACA BENEFICIARIES 
MAKES CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL SENSE 
KARI E. D’OTTAVIO∗ 
On June 15, 2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napoli-
tano announced a new immigration policy entitled Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).1  This initiative offers a renewable 
two-year grant of deportation relief along with work authorization and 
a social security number to eligible undocumented immigrants.2  De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals applicants must: be at least fif-
teen years old, have entered the United States before age sixteen, and 
have been under age thirty-one on the date of the DACA announce-
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 1.  Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DACA Initiative], http://www.uscis.gov/portal 
/site/uscis/menuitem.eb (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Deferred Action 
Process for Young People Who Are Law Enforcement Priorities” hyperlink); Secretary Napo-
litano Announces Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/ 
secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-young-people-who-are-low. 
 2.  DACA Initiative, supra note 1; Social Security Number—Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/deferred_action.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2013).  Applicants must not have lawful immigration status at the time of 
their application; they must have either (1) entered the United States without authoriza-
tion, or (2) entered the United States lawfully (for example, with a visa) but their lawful 
status expired (for example, they overstayed the allotted time of their visa).  DACA Initia-
tive, supra note 1. 
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ment;3 prove continuous residence in the United States;4 be currently 
in school or have graduated from high school;5 and pass a criminal 
background check.6  United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (“USCIS”) has made clear that DACA beneficiaries do not re-
ceive any sort of lawful immigration status,7 though it has clarified 
that DACA beneficiaries are in fact lawfully present in the United 
States.8 
                                                        
 3.  DACA Initiative, supra note 1.  Note that granting deferred action is an act of 
prosecutorial discretion by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  Specifically, DACA applicants must prove continuous residence in the United 
States for five years prior to the date of the DACA announcement up until they submit 
their application, and that they were physically present in the United States on the date of 
the announcement.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals applicants may fulfill this educational 
requirement by proving they obtained a General Educational Development (“GED”) cer-
tificate or were honorably discharged from the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed Forces.  Id. 
 6.  Id.  Specifically, DACA applicants must prove that they have not been convicted of 
any felonies, “significant misdemeanor[s],” or three or more non-significant misdemean-
ors, and “do not . . . pose a threat to national security or public safety.”  Id.  “[S]ignificant 
misdemeanor[s]” include “offense[s] of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; 
burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driv-
ing under the influence,” or “an offense . . . for which the individual was sentenced to time 
in custody of more than 90 days.”  Id.  “[T]hreat to public safety or national security” in-
cludes, inter alia, “gang membership, participation in criminal activities, or participation in 
activities that threaten the United States.”  Id.; Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DACA FAQs], http://www.uscis.gov/ 
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Deferred 
Action Process for Young People Who Are Law Enforcement Priorities” hyperlink; then 
follow “Frequently Asked Questions” hyperlink). 
 7.  DACA Initiative, supra note 1 (“Deferred action does not provide an individual 
with lawful status.”). 
 8.  DACA FAQs, supra note 6 (“An individual who has received deferred action is au-
thorized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be present in the United 
States, and is therefore considered by DHS to be lawfully present during the period de-
ferred action is in effect.”).  “Lawful presence” is often thought of as ceasing accrual of un-
lawful presence, or “period of stay not authorized.”  See Memorandum from Donald 
Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations Directorate, Lori Scialabba, Assoc. Dir., 
Refugee, Asylum and Int’l Operations Directorate, and Pearl Chang, Acting Chief, Office 
of Pol’y and Strategy, to USCIS Field Leadership, 9–11 (May 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/revision
_redesign_AFM.PDF (explaining the difference between “unlawful status” and “unlawful 
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Soon after the announcement, thousands of young immigrants 
lined up at DACA clinics around the country.9  At the same time, a 
number of states responded with powerful statements in opposition to 
DACA.  For example, the governors of Arizona10 and Nebraska11 an-
                                                        
presence”).  Moreover, “[t]here are some circumstances in which an alien whose status is 
actually unlawful is, nevertheless, protected from the accrual of unlawful presence . . . [a]s 
a matter of policy . . . .”  Id. at 33.  Those granted deferred action fall within this category.  
Id. at 42.   
 9.  Susan Carroll, Young Immigrants Line Up for Break from Deportation Threat, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Aug. 14, 2012, 8:16 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/ 
Young-immigrants-line-up-for-break-from-3788047.php; Alan Gomez, DREAMers Line Up as 
Deportation-Reprieve Program Begins, USA TODAY (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:34 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-08-15/homeland-security-
immigration-program/57065692/1; Julia Preston, Young Immigrants, in America Illegally, 
Line Up for Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2012, at A8.  It is estimated that as many as 1.76 
million undocumented immigrants could benefit from this program.  JEANNE BATALOVA & 
MICHELLE MITTELSTADT, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION: 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE DREAMERS POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE UNDER THE DEFERRED 
ACTION POLICY 1 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS24_ 
deferredaction.pdf. 
 10.  Arizona Governor Janice K. Brewer issued Executive Order 2012-06, which denied 
state benefits to DACA beneficiaries, two months after the DACA announcement.  Ariz. 
Exec. Order 2012-06, Re-Affirming Intent of Arizona Law in Response to the Federal Government’s 
Deferred Action Program (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/ 
EO_081512_2012-06.pdf.  Eventually, the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division revised its list of 
identity documents for proving legal presence, a requirement to obtain an Arizona driver’s 
license, to specifically exclude employment authorization documents (“EADs”) obtained 
by DACA beneficiaries.  Identification Requirements, MOTOR VEHICLE DIV., ARIZ. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., http://mvd.azdot.gov/mvd/formsandpub/viewPDF.asp?lngProductKey=1410& 
lngFormInfoKey=1410 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).  The Motor Vehicle Division still ac-
cepted EADs from other individuals, including noncitizens who are beneficiaries of other 
types of deferred action.  Id.; see also Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. 
CTR. [hereinafter NILC DACA and Driver’s Licenses], http://www.nilc.org/dacadrivers 
licenses.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2013) (“[T]he Arizona Motor Vehicle Division revised 
its list of identity documents to exclude EADs obtained by DACA recipients, while preserv-
ing eligibility for all other individuals with EADs.”).  The Arizona executive order is already 
the subject of litigation.  See Cindy Carcamo, Arizona Lawsuit Challenges Restrictions on Driv-
er’s Licenses, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/29/nation 
/la-na-arizona-licenses-20121130 (“A contingent of civil and immigrant rights organiza-
tions launched a lawsuit [on November 29, 2012] against Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer, chal-
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nounced that DACA beneficiaries would not be eligible to receive 
state benefits, in particular driver’s licenses.12  Michigan’s Secretary of 
State initially followed suit.13  At first, Iowa’s Department of Transpor-
tation also announced that it would not issue driver’s licenses to 
DACA beneficiaries.14 
The majority of states, however, confirmed that DACA beneficiar-
ies were eligible for driver’s licenses.15  California even changed its law 
to reflect its approval.16  After USCIS’s clarification on the lawful pres-
                                                        
lenging an executive order she issued that denies driver’s licenses to some youths who re-
cently received immigration relief and work permits under a new Obama administration 
program.”). 
 11.  Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman announced his opposition to DACA and stat-
ed that Nebraska will not issue driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries.  Brent Martin, Ne-
braska to Defy Obama Administration Deferred Action Program, NEB. RADIO NETWORK (Aug. 20, 
2012), http://nebraskaradionetwork.com/2012/08/20/nebraska-to-defy-obama-admin 
istration-deferred-action-program-audio/; Heineman Stands by Driver’s License Policy, 
OMAHA.COM (Dec. 4, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.omaha.com/article/20121204/NEWS/ 
121209866#heineman-stands-by-driver-s-license-policy. 
 12.  Patrik Jonsson, Obama’s DREAM Act-lite Runs into Trouble as Nebraska, Arizona Go 
Rogue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
Politics/2012/0818/Obama-s-DREAM-Act-lite-runs-into-more-trouble-as-Nebraska-Arizona-
go-rogue. 
 13.  Jonathan Oosting, Federal Program Allows Some Illegal Immigrants to Work, but They 
Won’t Be Able to Drive in Michigan, MLIVE (Oct. 18. 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.mlive.com 
/politics/index.ssf/2012/10/federal_program_allows_some_il.html. 
 14.  Dar Danielson, DOT Won’t Approve Licenses for Illegals on Deferred Action Status, 
RADIO IOWA (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.radioiowa.com/2012/12/27/dot-wont-approve-
licenses-for-illegals-on-deferred-action-status/. 
 15.  See NILC DACA and Driver’s Licenses, supra note 10 (noting that governors and 
other officials in almost forty states have confirmed that DACA beneficiaries are eligible 
for driver’s licenses). 
 16.  See CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.6 (West 2012) (“(a) Any federal document demon-
strating favorable action by the federal government for acceptance of a person into the 
deferred action for childhood arrivals program shall satisfy the requirements of Section 
12801.5.  (b) The department may issue an original driver’s license to the person who 
submits proof of presence in the United States as authorized under federal law pursuant to 
subdivision (a) and either a social security account number or ineligibility for a social se-
curity account number.”). 
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ence of DACA beneficiaries, Michigan17 and Iowa18 reversed course 
and agreed to issue driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries.19 
                                                        
 17.  See State to Issue Driver’s Licenses to Qualified Deferred Action Program Participants After 
Federal Government Reversal, MICH. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.michigan. 
gov/sos/0,4670,7-127—294244—,00.html (quoting Michigan Secretary of State Ruth 
Johnson: “The feds now say they consider these young people to be lawfully present while 
they participate in the DACA program, so we are required to issue driver’s licenses and 
identification cards”). 
 18.  See Iowa DOT Will Issue Driver’s Licenses or Nonoperator IDs to Persons Granted Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals Status, IOWA DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.news.iowadot.gov/newsandinfo/2013/01/iowa-dot-will-issue-drivers-licenses-
or-nonoperator-ids-to-persons-granted-deferred-action-for-child.html (determining that it 
can now issue driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries). 
 19.  Likewise, North Carolina’s Division of Motor Vehicles initially showed some re-
sistance to issuing driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries, but quickly turned around after 
the State’s Chief Deputy Attorney General issued a legal opinion on the lawful presence of 
DACA beneficiaries even before USCIS made this clear.  See Letter from Grayson G. Kelley, 
N.C. Chief Deputy Attorney Gen., to J. Eric Boyette, Acting Comm’r of the N.C. Div. of 
Motor Vehicles (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.latinamericancoalition.org/pdf/ 
130117-NCAG-letter-to-DMV.pdf (“Based upon our review of the historical background 
and legal concepts applicable to prosecutorial discretion and deferred status in the en-
forcement of immigration laws, we believe that individuals who present documentation 
demonstrating a grant of deferred action by the United States government are legally pre-
sent in the United States and entitled to a drivers license of limited duration, assuming all 
other criteria are met.”); see also Bruce Siceloff and Anne Blythe, NC Will Grant Driving Priv-
ileges to Immigrants in Federal Program, NEWSOBSERVER (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.news 
observer.com/2013/02/14/2680885/nc-will-grant-driving-privileges.html (“The state Divi-
sion of Motor Vehicles will comply with a state attorney general’s opinion and issue driv-
er’s licenses to thousands of young illegal immigrants who are eligible to drive because of a 
federal program that gives them temporary protection from deportation, Transportation 
Secretary Tony Tata said [on February 14, 2013].”).  Soon after this turnaround, North 
Carolina’s Division of Motor Vehicles announced that it would begin to issue newly de-
signed driver’s licenses to certain classes of non-citizens that clearly marked their lack of 
lawful status; DACA beneficiaries will be the first class to receive the new licenses.  Ber-
trand M. Gutierrez, New N.C. Driver’s Licenses Will Flag Non-U.S. Citizens, WINSTON-SALEM J. 
(Feb. 20, 2013, 8:19 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/state_region/article_c2edaa 
a8-7bc4-11e2-860d-0019bb30f31a.html (“Across the top of the new license is a pink strip.  
In the center, red capital letters say, “NO LAWFUL STATUS.”  On the side, another set of 
red capital letters say, “LIMITED TERM,” referring to [DACA beneficiaries’] two-year re-
prieve from deportation.”). 
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The overwhelming state support for licensing DACA beneficiar-
ies exemplifies a rare success story in the area of immigrants and driv-
er’s licenses.  Access to driver’s licenses for undocumented immi-
grants has long been contested and became especially restrictive after 
the September 11th terrorist attacks.20  Whether states should allow 
DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses is the most recent de-
bate.21  This Comment will discuss the legal trends surrounding the 
debate on issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants,22 
analyze legal arguments that explain why states that deny driver’s li-
censes to DACA beneficiaries would likely be defeated in court,23 and 
explain why states that allow DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s li-
censes made a wise policy decision.24 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court of the United States has never heard a case 
on the legitimacy of a state restriction or prohibition on issuing driv-
er’s licenses to immigrants.25  Lower federal and state courts, however, 
have ruled on various constitutional challenges to immigrant-
                                                        
 20.  See infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. DEFERRED 
ACTION PROGRAM REVIVES DEBATE OVER DRIVER’S LICENSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANTS (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/ 
display.cfm?ID=926 (“As the number of unauthorized immigrants granted benefits under 
the Obama administration’s recent deferred action program reaches a critical mass, it has 
rekindled debate over an enduring contentious issue—the role that immigration status 
should play in the granting of driver’s licenses.”); Sylvia Cochran, States Clash Over Driver’s 
Licenses for Deferred Action Filers, YAHOO!NEWS (Aug. 17, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/ 
states-clash-over-driver-licenses-deferred-action-filers-161000234.html (discussing Arizona’s 
and California’s opposite reactions to DACA); Corey Dade, New Immigration Battle: Driver’s 
Licenses, NPR (Dec. 28, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/ 
28/168214192/new-immigration-battle-drivers-licenses (discussing state opposition to 
DACA). 
 22.  See infra Part I. 
 23.  See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 24.  See infra Part II.C. 
 25.  In Alexander v. Sandoval, however, the Court struck down a non-English speaker’s 
attempt to force the State of Alabama to provide a driver’s license test in Spanish because 
it determined there was no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations 
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  532 U.S. 275, 278–79, 293 (2001). 
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restrictive driver’s license laws.26  Part I.A discusses the prevalence of 
equal protection challenges to immigrant-restrictive driver’s license 
laws.  Part I.B discusses the less prevalent but equally important pre-
emption challenges to such laws. 
A.  Equal Protection Challenges 
The Equal Protection Clause provides that “No State shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”27  Thus, all forms of state action must comply with this clause.28  
Depending on the classification they draw and the kind of right they 
affect, state laws are subjected to different levels of scrutiny when chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds: strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, or rational basis review.  The level of scrutiny used can dic-
tate the success of an equal protection claim.  Strict scrutiny is used if 
a statute classifies a suspect class or impinges on a fundamental 
right.29  A court using strict scrutiny review will uphold a law only if 
the state can prove that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling state interest.30  This is a very high burden for the state to 
meet; thus the use of strict scrutiny usually results in invalidation of 
the challenged law.31  If a statute classifies individuals on the basis of 
                                                        
 26.  See infra Parts I.A–B. 
 27.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
 28.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (concluding that “State action of 
every kind” is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  The 
most obvious form of state action is passing, amending, or implementing a state law.  See, 
e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (holding that no state may pass election 
laws that violate the Equal Protection Clause).  An executive order is also a form of state 
action, as it has the same force of a law although it involves no action by the state legisla-
ture.  See, e.g., Ill. State Emps. Ass’n v. Walker, 315 N.E.2d 9, 10–13 (Ill. 1974) (determining 
that the Illinois governor’s executive order requiring state employees to file financial dis-
closure statements did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 29.  See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (dis-
cussing strict scrutiny for laws that make classifications based on race, alienage, and na-
tional origin); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 & n.3 (1976) (explaining that 
strict scrutiny must be applied to laws interfering with fundamental rights, such as voting). 
 30.  See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[Such] laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will 
be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”). 
 31.  See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (striking down a Virginia mis-
cegenation law using strict scrutiny).  But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
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gender or illegitimacy, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny and will be 
upheld if the state can prove that it is substantially related to an im-
portant state interest.32  This burden on the state is not as high as the 
burden for strict scrutiny, but still often results in invalidation of the 
challenged law.33  Any statute that does not require more stringent 
scrutiny is subject to rational basis review.34  Under this standard, a 
statute is entitled to a presumption of validity if the classification it 
draws is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.35  To overcome 
this presumption, the challenger has the burden of negating all pos-
sible rational justifications for the classification.36  Thus, rational basis 
review is very deferential to the state.37 
Part I.A.1 discusses undocumented immigrants’ frequent but of-
ten unsuccessful attempts to argue for heightened scrutiny based on 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plyler v. Doe,38 the first and only time 
                                                        
215–16, 218–20 (1944) (upholding an executive order to intern Japanese-Americans dur-
ing World War II using strict scrutiny). 
 32.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”); 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (reasoning that illegitimacy warranted inter-
mediate scrutiny because it is “a characteristic determined by causes not within the control 
of the illegitimate individual” and imposing disabilities on an illegitimate child defies the 
basic principle that “legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibil-
ity or wrongdoing” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 33.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 534 (1996) (concluding that 
the State of Virginia failed to provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for exclud-
ing women from the Virginia Military Institute). 
 34.  See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that the general rule of rational basis review 
gives way only to the narrow categories that trigger heightened scrutiny). 
 35.  See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“State legislatures are 
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, 
their laws result in some inequality.  A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).   
 36.  See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (“The 
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it.” (citation omitted)). 
 37.  See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 298–99, 304–05 (1976) (per 
curiam) (determining a city ordinance, which prohibited new food cart vendors from op-
erating in New Orleans’ French Quarter, was rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est—preserving the appearance of the area). 
 38.  457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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the Court has ruled on an equal protection challenge brought by un-
documented immigrants.39  Part I.A.2 discusses commonly proffered 
state interests in restricting undocumented immigrants from obtain-
ing driver’s licenses and courts’ repeated deference to the state. 
1. Level of Scrutiny Used for Equal Protection Challenges to 
Immigrant-Restrictive Driver’s License Laws Brought by 
Undocumented Immigrants 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause protects “all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of 
the United States], without regard to any differences of race, of color, 
or of nationality . . . .”40  In striking down a Texas statute that denied 
free public education to children who were in the country illegally,41 
the Court in Plyler acknowledged for the first time in American juris-
prudence that the Equal Protection Clause protects undocumented 
immigrants.42  The Court rejected a strict scrutiny analysis,43 but it re-
quired the State of Texas to demonstrate more than a rational basis 
for the challenged statute.44  According to the Court, Texas failed to 
show that denying “innocent children the free public education that 
it offers to other children residing within its borders furthers some 
substantial state interest.”45  Although the Court did not acknowledge 
                                                        
 39.  See id. at 205 (“The question presented . . . is whether, consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented 
school-age children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens 
of the United States or legally admitted aliens.”). 
 40.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 41.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205, 230–31. 
 42.  See id. at 215 (“That a person’s initial entry into a State, or into the United States, 
was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact 
of his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter. . . .  And until he leaves the jurisdic-
tion . . . he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws . . . .”). 
 43.  See id. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’ . . .  
Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, 
by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.  Indeed, entry into 
the class is itself a crime.  In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented 
status is a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”). 
 44.  See id. at 224 (“[T]he discrimination contained in [the Texas statute] can hardly 
be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 45.  Id. at 230. 
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it at the time, it is now widely understood that the Court used inter-
mediate scrutiny to reach its decision.46 
Based on the Court’s analysis in Plyler, undocumented immi-
grants have often argued that strict scrutiny, or at least intermediate 
scrutiny, is the proper level of scrutiny to use for an equal protection 
analysis of immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws.47  Courts, howev-
er, have generally refused to extend Plyler any further than its limited 
facts.  Instead, courts have used rational basis review and, accordingly, 
have upheld the state laws.  For example, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Georgia in John Doe No. 1 v. Georgia Department 
of Public Safety48 underscored the distinction the Plyler Court drew be-
tween “illegal aliens and their children”: the parents voluntarily de-
cided to enter the class of undocumented immigrants, while it was be-
yond the children’s control.49  Quoting Plyler, the court said: 
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may 
withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence 
within the United States is the product of their own unlawful 
conduct.  These arguments do not apply with the same force 
to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children 
                                                        
 46.  See, e.g., Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1464–65 (9th Cir. 1985) (reading 
Plyler as using intermediate scrutiny); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen 
(LULAC I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (noting 
that some commentators have read Plyler as using intermediate scrutiny); see also infra notes 
54, 57. 
 47.  See, e.g., LULAC I, 2004 WL 3048724, at *3 (“Plaintiffs argue that strict scrutiny 
analysis, or at the very least, intermediate scrutiny analysis, is required by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe . . . .”); Doe v. Edgar, No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91805, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989) (“The plaintiffs, in reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Plyler, argue for the application of the intermediate standard of review . . . .”); Cubas v. 
Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (noting plaintiffs’ reliance on Plyler in 
their equal protection challenge), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007).  Undocumented im-
migrants have also argued for strict scrutiny under the fundamental right to travel; courts, 
however, have quickly dismissed such claims.  See, e.g., LULAC I, 2004 WL 3048724, at *4 
(“[G]iven their status, illegal aliens do not have a constitutional right to move freely about 
the country or the state.”); John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 
1369, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“Illegal aliens are subject to immediate arrest and ultimate 
deportation.  It strains all bounds of logic and reason to say that such a person has a fun-
damental right of interstate travel.”); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 
1999) (finding no “fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle”). 
 48.   147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
 49.  Id. at 1372–73. 
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of such illegal entrants.  At the least, those who elect to enter 
our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be 
prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not lim-
ited to, deportation.  But the children of those illegal en-
trants are not comparably situated.50 
The court used this reasoning to stress that the undocumented 
immigrants challenging an immigrant-restrictive Georgia driver’s li-
cense law51 were not a suspect class.52  The U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee in League of United Latin American Citizens 
v. Bredesen53 (LULAC I) also used the same distinction to reject the 
plaintiffs’ claim that a strict scrutiny analysis was warranted for a Ten-
nessee law limiting undocumented immigrants to temporary driving 
certificates rather than driver’s licenses.54  Similarly, New York’s in-
termediate court in Cubas v. Martinez55 distinguished Plyler by empha-
sizing that the undocumented immigrants challenging an immigrant-
restrictive New York driver’s license law56 were all adults, not innocent 
                                                        
 50.  Id. at 1373 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1982)). 
 51.  The challenged Georgia law forbade anyone not a U.S. citizen or a legally author-
ized alien from obtaining a Georgia driver’s license.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-1(15)(B) 
(2011) (stating that only U.S. citizens or legally authorized aliens may be Georgia resi-
dents); Id. § 40-5-20(a) (2011) (“Any person who is a resident of this state for 30 days shall 
obtain a Georgia driver’s license before operating a motor vehicle in this state.”). 
 52.  See John Doe No. 1, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1373 (“Following Plyler, it is clear that illegal 
aliens are not a ‘suspect class’ that would subject the Georgia statute to strict scrutiny.”).   
 53.  No. 3:04-0613, 2004 WL 3048724 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004). 
 54.  Id. at *1, *4–5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (“Membership in this class is voluntary, 
and does not resemble the class of children described in Plyler.  Therefore, the heightened 
scrutiny analysis that was applied in Plyler is not warranted here.”).  The challenged Ten-
nessee law allowed undocumented immigrants to receive a driving certificate valid for one 
year, while those lawfully present could receive a driving certificate valid for up to five 
years.  Id. at *1.  Only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents could receive Tennes-
see driver’s licenses.  Id.  Note that, under current Tennessee law, only lawfully present 
immigrants are eligible for temporary driver’s licenses; the law no longer makes reference 
to driving certificates.  TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-50-331(g) (2012).  It is still the case that on-
ly U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents may receive permanent driver’s licenses.  
Id. § 55-50-321(c)(1)(C) (2012). 
 55.  819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007). 
 56.  The challenged New York law required a social security number to obtain a driv-
er’s license.  N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 502(1) (2011).  On its face, the law did not discrimi-
nate against a particular class, but because undocumented immigrants do not have social 
security numbers, the law, by its terms, drew a distinction between those illegally and legal-
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children.57  Finally, in Doe v. Edgar,58 the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois distinguished Plyler by comparing the life-
time hardship caused by the deprivation of a free basic education with 
the marginal harm caused by the deprivation of a driver’s license.59 
At least one court has applied strict scrutiny in an equal protec-
tion analysis of an immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law, although 
its decision was later overturned.60  In People v. Quiroga-Puma,61 an un-
documented immigrant was charged with unlicensed operation of a 
motor vehicle and failure to provide proof of valid insurance.62  The 
New York Justice Court for the Village of Westbury raised, sua sponte, 
an equal protection challenge of the immigrant-restrictive New York 
statute that prevented the defendant from obtaining a driver’s license 
in the first place.63  Although the court only cited and did not actually 
rely on Plyler,64 it found that the defendant was a member of a suspect 
class.65  The court stressed that because immigrants cannot vote, 
                                                        
ly in the country.  See Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 13–15 (quoting the challenged law, which 
makes no reference to a particular class of persons, but explaining that “only applicants 
who are authorized to remain in the country for more than one year . . . are generally eli-
gible for licensing”). 
 57.  Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 24 (“[T]he [Plyler] Court seems to have reasoned that 
somewhat stricter scrutiny was required because the children of undocumented aliens lack 
any control over their illegal entry into the United States.  Here, plaintiffs are all adults.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 58  No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91805 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989). 
 59.  Id. at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989) (“[T]he harm caused by the deprivation of a driv-
ers license, while not insubstantial, pales in comparison to the extreme harm caused by the 
denial of a basic education.”).  
 60.  See infra note 68. 
 61.  848 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 884 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Term 
2009). 
 62.  Id. at 854–55.   
 63.  Id. at 856–57, 859.  “The Commissioner [of the Department of Motor Vehicles] 
has in fact set requirements in such a way that VTL § 502-1 discriminates against undocu-
mented aliens.  It is impossible for an undocumented immigrant to prove their identity 
under the current scheme established by the Commissioner.”  Id. at 862.  The challenged 
New York law is the same as in Cubas.  See supra note 56. 
 64.  Quiroga-Puma, 848 N.Y.S.2d at 861. 
 65.  Id. at 862 (“The Court finds that the defendant is a member of a suspect class.  He 
is an alien, and a non-citizen.  As such, he triggers the appropriate consideration under 
Equal Protection analysis.”). 
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“[t]hey are silenced and shut out of our legal debate.”66  According to 
the court, this fact undermines any argument that undocumented 
immigrants are not a suspect class since they do not have the political 
power to protect themselves.67  Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny 
and found the challenged New York statute violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.68  With the exception of this court, though, most courts 
have indicated that the heightened scrutiny used for the undocu-
mented immigrants in Plyler is fairly limited in application.  Accord-
ingly, equal protection challenges to immigrant-restrictive driver’s li-
cense laws brought by undocumented immigrants have only been 
afforded rational basis review. 
2.   State Interests in Denying Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented 
Immigrants 
Once a court rejects a heightened level of scrutiny for an immi-
grant-restrictive driver’s license law, it will uphold the law if the classi-
fication drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.69  In 
Doe No. 1, the court recognized three legitimate state interests in 
Georgia’s immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law: (1) preventing 
governmental machinery from facilitating the concealment of illegal 
aliens; (2) preserving scarce resources by not giving driving tests to il-
                                                        
 66.  Id. at 863–64. 
 67.  See id. (“This particular fact is most important—they cannot better their situation 
and must rely on citizens to take up their causes.”). 
 68.  Id. at 865.  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term reversed the justice 
court on the grounds that it should not have raised constitutional claims sua sponte, when 
there was no evidence that the defendant had standing to assert the claims raised on his 
behalf:  
[T]he record does not indicate that defendant ever applied for a driver’s license 
and, even assuming that he did apply and was denied a license, that the grounds 
for the denial were unrelated to age, the ability to pass the visual, written and 
performance test requirements, or some other civil or physical impediment to 
obtaining a license that is unrelated to the constitutional issues herein raised, 
much less that the denial was, in fact, based on his failure to produce the re-
quired documentation.  It is axiomatic that there is no standing to complain 
where an alleged defect in or violation of a statute does not injure the party seek-
ing redress . . . . 
People v. Quiroga-Puma, 884 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568–69 (N.Y. App. Term 2009) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69.  See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
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legal aliens subject to immediate deportation; and (3) promoting 
economic safety because “persons subject to immediate deportation 
will not be financially responsible for property damage or personal in-
jury” resulting from car accidents.70  Thus, the court did not find the 
law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.71  In Sanchez v. State,72 
a class action lawsuit brought by undocumented immigrants and li-
censed drivers73 against Iowa’s immigrant-restrictive driver’s license 
law,74 the State of Iowa proffered the same or similar interests as 
Georgia plus more: (1) preventing its governmental machinery from 
facilitating the concealment of illegal aliens; (2) limiting Iowa’s ser-
vices to citizens and legal residents; (3) restricting Iowa driver’s li-
censes to those who are not subject to deportation; and (4) discourag-
ing illegal immigration.75  The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the 
plaintiffs did not sufficiently negate the first proffered interest;76 thus 
it did not reach the legitimacy of the other three interests.77  Accord-
ingly, the court did not find the law in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.78 
                                                        
 70.  John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 
2001).  
 71.  See id. (“[The law] is a legitimate exercise of the police power . . . .”). 
 72.  692 N.W.2d 812 (Iowa 2005). 
 73.  Id. at 815 (“Juan and Maria Sanchez represent a class of illegal, undocumented 
aliens present in the state who want to obtain driver’s licenses.  John and Jane Doe repre-
sent a class of licensed drivers in the state who want the [Iowa Department of Transporta-
tion] to license the Sanchez class to make it safer for members of the Doe class to drive on 
the state’s roads.”).  
 74.  The challenged Iowa law, like in Cubas and Quiroga-Puma, required driver’s license 
applicants to provide social security numbers.  IOWA CODE § 321.182(1)(a) (2009).  Iowa’s 
Department of Transportation could waive this requirement, id., but only for immigrants 
who were authorized by the federal government to be in the country.  Id. § 321.196(1).  
Undocumented immigrants, consequently, could not obtain Iowa driver’s licenses. 
 75.  Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 818. 
 76.  Id. at 819; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 77.  Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 819 (“We conclude the state’s licensing scheme is rationally 
related to the legitimate state interest of not allowing its governmental machinery to be a 
facilitator for the concealment of illegal aliens.  Thus, the classes have failed to carry their 
burden of negating all reasonable bases that could justify the challenged statute.  Fur-
thermore, we need not address the legitimacy of the other state interests proffered in this 
case.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 78.  Id. 
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The court in Cubas found that New York’s “successful regulation 
of motor vehicle operations and the assurance of the integrity of iden-
tification documents” were legitimate state interests advanced by its 
immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law.79  The court explained that 
the new identification procedures “serve a vital governmental purpose 
in preventing the abuse of identification documents to commit acts of 
fraud or, as tragically illustrated by the events of September 11, 2001, 
acts of terrorism.”80  Similarly, in LULAC I, the court found that “mak-
ing the state safe from crime and terrorism” was a legitimate basis for 
Tennessee’s law limiting undocumented immigrants and temporary 
legal aliens to temporary driving certificates.81  Both courts found that 
the state laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.82 
In contrast, the court applying strict scrutiny in Quiroga-Puma did 
not find the two state interests raised sua sponte—national security 
and the economy—compelling enough to justify denying driver’s li-
censes to undocumented immigrants.83  Although the court acknowl-
edged the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of national security as a 
compelling state interest,84 it reasoned that: 
Curtailing the action of immigrants by not permitting them 
to drive has no rational connection to national security.  If 
anything, granting licenses to drive increases our domestic 
safety by insuring that immigrants are certified to drive.  
Denying immigrants, regardless of their legal status, a driv-
                                                        
 79.  Cubas v. Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 
(N.Y. 2007). 
 80.  Id. at 25. 
 81.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004 
WL 3048724, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004).  “The State of Tennessee contends that 
homeland security is the basis for limiting illegal aliens and temporary legal aliens to issu-
ance of a drivers’ certificate covering a shorter period of time than a drivers’ license, and 
stating on the face of the certificate ‘not valid for identification.’”  Id. at *5. 
 82.  Id. at *6; Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 24.  The Cubas court was “not unsympathetic” to 
otherwise law-abiding undocumented immigrants who, without driver’s licenses, “face[] 
difficulty in pursuing employment, commuting to a place of employment or elsewhere, or 
obtaining financial or other services.”  Id. at 25.  The court, however, found the State’s in-
terest in verifying identity outweighed the plaintiffs’ inconvenience in not being able to 
obtain driver’s licenses.  Id. 
 83.  People v. Quiroga-Puma, 848 N.Y.S.2d 853, 864–65 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 884 
N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Term 2009). 
 84.  Id. at 864 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). 
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er’s license in no way constitutes a necessary means for 
achieving national security.85 
The court found economic arguments, such as undocumented 
immigrants taking away jobs from U.S. citizens, equally unpersuasive; 
moreover, “the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue of wheth-
er the economic concerns of a state government, much less the con-
cerns of public opinion, qualify as a compelling state interest.”86  
Again, with the exception of this decision, courts have indicated that 
state interests in crime prevention, national security, and state re-
source preservation satisfy rational basis review. 
B.  Pre-emption Challenges 
The Supremacy Clause provides that the United States Constitu-
tion, and laws and treaties made pursuant to it, “shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”87  The Supreme Court has declared: “[U]nder the 
Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 
any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, 
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”88  The 
Court has recognized three major ways of finding pre-emption: (1) a 
federal law expressly pre-empts a state or local law;89 (2) federal regu-
lation has wholly occupied a field;90 or (3) a state law conflicts with 
federal law—either the state law makes it physically impossible to 
comply with federal law, or the state law frustrates the objectives of a 
                                                        
 85.  Id. at 865. 
 86.  Id. at 864. 
 87.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 88.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012) (“There is no doubt 
that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute contain-
ing an express preemption provision.”); Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“Pre-emption may be either 
expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in 
the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”  (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 90.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (“Field preemption reflects a congressional decision 
to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”); 
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“[F]ield preemption [occurs] where the scheme of federal regulation 
is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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federal scheme.91  There is, however, a presumption against pre-
emption of state laws that regulate a field the states have traditionally 
occupied.92  Arizona v. United States93—the Court’s most recent articu-
lation of its pre-emption doctrine in the area of immigration law—
helped define these principles.94  There, the Court considered four 
provisions of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, a state immigration enforcement policy com-
monly known as S.B. 1070, and found all but one pre-empted by fed-
eral immigration law.95 
Part I.B.1 discusses unsuccessful attempts to argue that pre-
emption principles bar immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws be-
cause the federal government has exclusive authority over regulating 
immigration.96  Part I.B.2 discusses the Real ID Act, a federal licensing 
                                                        
 91.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (maintaining that conflict pre-emption occurs where 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility” and where 
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gade, 
505 U.S. at 98 (same); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (recognizing that a “‘[c]onflict in 
technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt pol-
icy’” (quoting Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971))). 
 92.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (“In preemption analysis, courts should assume that 
‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947))).  
 93  132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 94.  Id. at 2500–05. 
 95.  Id. at 2497, 2510.  Section 3, which created a new state misdemeanor for failing to 
carry registration papers, was found pre-empted because the Court concluded that Con-
gress intended to wholly occupy the field of alien registration and foreclose any state regu-
lation in the area.  Id. at 2501–03.  Section 5(C), which likewise created a new state mis-
demeanor for working without proper authorization, was found pre-empted as frustrating 
federal objectives.  Id. at 2503–05.  According to the Court, Congress debated, discussed, 
and ultimately rejected proposals to make such conduct a criminal offense.  Id. at 2504.  
Section 6, which authorized state officers to make warrantless arrests for removable offens-
es, was found pre-empted for similar reasons: the Court found that it created an obstacle 
to Congress’s objectives by providing state officers wide, unilateral authority to arrest im-
migrants without any input from or cooperation with the federal government.  Id. at 2505–
07.  The only provision upheld was section 2(B), also known as the “Show Me Your Papers” 
provision, which requires state officers to investigate the immigration status of suspected 
undocumented persons.  Id. at 2507–10. 
 96.  Note that these cases were decided before the Real ID Act was passed. 
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scheme passed by Congress in 2005, which likely complicates pre-
emption challenges. 
1.   Failed Pre-emption Challenges to Immigrant-Restrictive Driver’s 
License Laws 
Although the power of the federal government to regulate immi-
gration has long been established,97 courts have consistently denied 
pre-emption challenges to immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws.  
For example, the plaintiff in Doe No. 1 argued that the U.S. Constitu-
tion pre-empts the entire field of immigration law, and thus a Georgia 
law restricting undocumented immigrants from obtaining a Georgia 
driver’s license should be pre-empted.98  The court disagreed, reason-
ing that “the Georgia statutes mirror federal objectives by denying 
Georgia driver’s licenses to those who are in this country illegally ac-
cording to federal law.”99  Moreover, “[i]t is a legitimate exercise of 
the police power to regulate and supervise those authorized to exer-
cise the privilege of driving automobiles on the highways of Geor-
gia.”100  Based on this reasoning, the court declined to find the Geor-
gia statute pre-empted.101 
Similarly in LULAC I, the plaintiffs argued that the federal gov-
ernment’s regulation of immigration pre-empted Tennessee’s immi-
grant-restrictive driver’s license laws.102  The court found otherwise, 
reasoning that the Tennessee legislation did not attempt to regulate 
immigration; rather, it “relie[d] on federal immigration standards in 
determining whether a person is eligible for a drivers’ license or a 
drivers’ certificate.”103  Furthermore, the court reasoned that “there 
[was] no indication that the federal government intend[ed] to com-
                                                        
 97.  See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Our cases have long recognized the 
preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within 
our borders.” (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 377–80 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–20 (1948); 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–68 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)). 
 98.  John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375–76 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 1376. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004 
WL 3048724, at *6–7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004).   
 103.  Id.  
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pletely occupy the field of drivers’ license issuance for immigrants” as 
this function “has traditionally been left to state governments.”104  Ac-
cordingly, the court declined to find the Tennessee statutes pre-
empted.105  Such cases demonstrate the tendency of courts to deny the 
argument that federal immigration laws pre-empt immigrant-
restrictive state driver’s license laws, focusing instead on how such 
laws complement federal law. 
2.  The Real ID Act 
The issuance of driver’s licenses has traditionally been a state 
function.106  Prior to September 11, 2001, the prevailing view was that 
each state determined its own issuance standards.107  This view 
changed when the final report of the National Commission on Ter-
rorist Attacks upon the United States recommended that “[t]he fed-
eral government should set standards for the issuance of birth certifi-
cates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses.”108  In re-
response, Congress passed the Real ID Act in May 2005.109  This Act 
provides federal standards for issuing driver’s licenses and identifica-
tion cards, including minimum issuance standards110 and evidence of 
                                                        
 104.  Id. at *7; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 105.  LULAC I, 2004 WL 3048724, at *6–7. 
 106.  See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]here is little 
question that licensing of drivers constitutes an integral portion of those governmental 
services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their 
citizens.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also ALISON M. SMITH, 
CONG. RES. SERV., RL 32127, SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS ON THE ISSUANCE OF DRIVER’S 
LICENSES TO UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS 1 (2004), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&d 
id=450403 (“Eligibility for driver’s licenses is first and foremost a matter of state law.”). 
 107.  TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 34430, THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005: 
LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 1 (2008), available at http://www.fas. 
org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34430.pdf. 
 108.  THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 390 (2004), available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf. 
 109.  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Ter-
ror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 201–07, 119 Stat. 231, 310–16 (2005) [here-
inafter Real ID Act] (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301). 
 110.  Before they can issue a driver’s license or identification card, states are required, 
at a minimum, to verify: (1) a photo or non-photo document that includes the legal name 
and date of birth of the individual; (2) a valid document stating the date of birth of the 
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lawful status.111  The Act wholly restricts undocumented immigrants 
from obtaining driver’s licenses and limits certain noncitizens, includ-
ing deferred action recipients, to temporary driver’s licenses.112 
                                                        
individual; (3) a valid social security number or an explanation of non-eligibility for a so-
cial security number; and (4) a valid document showing the address and name of the indi-
vidual at their principal residence.  Id. at § 202(c)(1). 
 111.  The Act states: 
A State shall require, before issuing a driver’s license or identification card to a 
person, valid documentary evidence that the person—(i) is a citizen or national 
of the United States; (ii) is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent or tempo-
rary residence in the United States; (iii) has conditional permanent resident sta-
tus in the United States; (iv) has an approved application for asylum in the Unit-
ed States or has entered into the United States in refugee status; (v) has a valid, 
unexpired nonimmigrant visa or nonimmigrant visa status for entry into the 
United States; (vi) has a pending application for asylum in the United States; 
(vii) has a pending or approved application for temporary protected status in the 
United States; (viii) has approved deferred action status; or (ix) has a pending appli-
cation for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent resident in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in 
the United States. 
Id. § 202(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 112.  See id. § 202(c)(2)(C) (allowing only individuals with statuses in clauses (v) 
through (ix) in § 202(c)(2)(B), supra note 111, to receive a temporary driver’s license or 
temporary identification card set to expire on the date the individuals’ authorized stay in 
the United States expires).  Currently, only two states—Washington and New Mexico—
allow any qualified driver to obtain a driver’s license, regardless of their immigration sta-
tus.  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9(B) (2011) (allowing driver’s license applicants to provide 
a tax identification number in lieu of a social security number); Proof of Identity, WASH. ST. 
DEP’T OF LICENSING, http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/idproof.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2013) (allowing driver’s license applicants to provide proof of Washington residence in 
lieu of a social security number).  Utah allows those who cannot prove lawful presence to 
obtain “Driving Privilege Cards,” though “DPCs” cannot be used for identification purpos-
es.  See Driver License Division - Obtaining a Utah Driving Privilege Card (DPC), UTAH DEP’T OF 
PUB. SAFETY, http://publicsafety.utah.gov/dld/drivingprivilegecard.html (last updated 
Mar. 8, 2013).  Earlier this year, Illinois passed a bill that allows undocumented immi-
grants to obtain temporary driver’s licenses.  S.B. 957, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013), avail-
able at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=957&GAID=11&DocType 
ID=SB&SessionID=84&GA=97.  Likewise, Maryland recently passed a bill that repeals a law-
ful status requirement for driver’s license applications.  H.B. 789, 433rd Gen. Assemb. 
(Md. 2013), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/bills/hb/hb0789f.pdf.  
Other states are considering similar legislation.  See, e.g., Assemb. B. 60, 2013–2014 Leg., 
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State compliance with the Real ID Act is voluntary.113  If states opt 
not to comply with the federal standards, however, their state driver’s 
licenses will not be recognized for federal identification purposes.114  
Moreover, non-compliant states will not participate in the infor-
mation-sharing system the Real ID Act purports to create.115  Residents 
of non-compliant states may run into problems if their driver’s licens-
es are not accepted in compliant states, and vice versa.116  Although 
there are strong incentives for states to comply with the Real ID Act 
for the convenience of their residents, many states have nonetheless 
opposed it;117 states might regard the Real ID Act as an impractical 
and unfunded mandate.118 
Among other things, the Real ID Act has caused concern over 
whether it pre-empts state laws that set contrary standards for the is-
suance of driver’s licenses to immigrants.119  Given the voluntary na-
ture of the Real ID Act, the decision to issue or not to issue driver’s 
licenses to immigrants should remain entirely with the states.120  At 
least one court, however, used the Real ID Act to pre-empt an immi-
grant-restrictive state driver’s license law.  In League of United Latin 
                                                        
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (proposing to repeal provisions of existing law that require proof of 
lawful presence); S.B. 68, 2013 Gen Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013) (proposing to allow 
qualified Connecticut residents to obtain driver’s licenses regardless of immigration sta-
tus). 
 113.  See Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(a) (providing the process by which the De-
partment of Homeland Security determines whether states complied with the require-
ments of the Act); TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 19 (stating that the REAL ID Act is not 
binding on states). 
 114.  See Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(a)(1) (“[A] Federal agency may not accept, 
for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identification card issued by a State . . . unless 
the State is meeting the requirements of this section.”).  For example, residents of non-
compliant states cannot use their state driver’s licenses to board airplanes or enter federal 
buildings.  TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 19. 
 115.  TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 20. 
 116.  See id. at 19–20 (discussing possible ramifications for residents of non-compliant 
states). 
 117.  See id. at 17–19 (discussing states’ opposition to the Real ID Act). 
 118.  See What’s Wrong with REAL ID?, REALNIGHTMARE.ORG, www.realnightmare.org 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (describing the costs of the Real ID Act). 
 119.  See TATELMAN, supra note 107 at 29–30 (addressing whether states still have ulti-
mate control over the issuance of driver’s licenses with the Real ID Act in place). 
 120.  Id. at 30. 
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American Citizens v. Bredesen121 (LULAC II), the plaintiffs challenged a 
Tennessee statute that prohibited using matrícula consular cards as 
proof of identification for obtaining a Tennessee driver’s license.122  
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found 
that the Real ID Act, which similarly forbids using matrícula consular 
cards,123 pre-empted the Tennessee statute, rendering the lawsuit 
moot.124  Although the Real ID Act is voluntary, the court reasoned, 
non-compliant states’ driver’s licenses “could not be used to access 
federal facilities, board federally regulated commercial aircraft, or for 
‘any other purposes the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall de-
termine,’” and thus “states are likely to comply with the Act.”125  
“[G]iven the broad scope of the phrase ‘official purpose’ for which 
compliance with the Act is required, and that the federal interest in 
national security is one of the goals of the Act,” the court concluded 
that “Congress intended to preempt state law in this area of identity 
verification documentation for drivers’ licenses.”126  Thus, the court 
upheld the pre-emption challenge and, in so doing, upheld the re-
striction on immigrants.127  This reasoning has not been used often, 
but with an increasing number of Real ID-compliant states,128 it is like-
ly that pre-emption challenges focusing on the federal licensing 
scheme, rather than the federal immigration scheme, will arise. 
                                                        
 121.  No. 3:04-0613, 2005 WL 2034935 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 23, 2005).   
 122.  Id. at *1; TENN. CODE ANN. 55-50-321(g) (2012) (“The department [of motor ve-
hicles] shall not accept matricula consular cards as proof of identification for driver li-
cense application and issuance purposes.”).  Matrícula consular cards are identification 
cards issued by the Mexican Government to Mexican nationals residing outside of Mexico.  
KEVIN O’NEIL, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., CONSULAR ID CARDS: MEXICO AND BEYOND (Apr. 
2003), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=115. 
 123.  See Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(c)(3)(B) (providing that complying states, 
in deciding whether to issue driver’s licenses, shall not accept any foreign documents oth-
er than official passports). 
 124.  LULAC II, 2005 WL 2034935, at *1, *3. 
 125.  Id. at *2 (quoting Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 201(3)). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at *3. 
 128.  DHS Determines 13 States Meet REAL ID Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/12/20/dhs-determines-13-states-meet-
real-id-standards. 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the federal and 
state governments acted quickly to strengthen security laws, including 
restricting immigrants’ ability to obtain driver’s licenses.129  Numerous 
states passed laws restricting immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses 
specifically for security purposes.130  The Real ID Act represented the 
peak of these restrictions, as it limited many noncitizens to temporary 
driver’s licenses and prohibited undocumented immigrants from ob-
taining driver’s licenses altogether.131 
The new Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program raises 
a new question in the debate over licensing immigrants—whether 
states should allow DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses.  
Parts II.A and II.B discuss equal protection arguments and pre-
emption arguments, respectively, that support the issuance of driver’s 
licenses to DACA beneficiaries and suggests why states that deny driv-
er’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries erred.  Likewise, Part II.C address-
es policy arguments for why states that allow DACA beneficiaries to 
obtain driver’s licenses are headed in the right direction. 
                                                        
 129.  See, e.g., Immigrant Driver’s License Restrictions Challenged In Some States, IMMIGRANTS’ 
RTS. UPDATE (Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.), Oct. 21, 2002, at 13 (“Nationwide, 
approximately 63 bills introduced during the 2001–02 state legislative sessions addressed 
immigrants’ ability to obtain a driver’s license . . . . [A]lmost 50 of these proposals sought 
to limit access for immigrants . . . .”); see also H.R. 4633, 107th Cong. (2002) (requiring 
that a computer chip be embedded in a driver’s license or identification card with encod-
ed biometric data matching the license holder).  With widespread attention on terrorists’ 
ability to obtain driver’s licenses, it is often overlooked that all of the 9/11 terrorists could 
have gotten through airport security using their Saudi passports.  Margaret D. Stock, Li-
cense Policy a Win for Security, NEWSDAY (Oct. 1. 2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsday.com/ 
opinion/license-policy-a-win-for-security-1.667541. 
 130.  See, e.g., Jewish Cmty. Action v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 657 N.W.2d 604, 606, 609 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“The [Minnesota Department of Public Safety] determined that 
the rules [requiring driver’s license applicants to prove lawful presence in the United 
States] will tighten homeland security in Minnesota, noting that some of the terrorist activ-
ity in the United States is carried out by foreign nationals and that many foreign nationals 
are illegally present in this country.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra 
notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 131.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Equal Protection Arguments as Applied to DACA Beneficiaries 
The success of an equal protection challenge to a state re-
striction132 on issuing driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries depends 
in large part on the level of scrutiny a court uses and the interests the 
state proffers.133  Part II.A.1 analogizes the position of DACA benefi-
ciaries to the position of undocumented children in Plyler and under-
scores why this comparison would likely lead a court to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny to the state restriction.  Part II.A.2 highlights why 
past state interests in denying driver’s licenses to undocumented im-
migrants are inapplicable to the case of DACA beneficiaries. 
1.  State Driver’s License Restrictions on DACA Beneficiaries Should 
Be Afforded Intermediate Scrutiny 
Most courts have distinguished Plyler on the grounds that undoc-
umented immigrants denied driver’s licenses are not similarly situated 
to the innocent children in Plyler who were denied a free public edu-
cation.134  DACA beneficiaries, however, are similarly situated to the 
Plyler children.  The court in Doe No. 1 reasoned that the children in 
Plyler could not affect “their parents’ conduct []or their own status.”135  
Similarly, DACA is directed at undocumented immigrants who were 
brought into the United States as children by their parents,136 bearing 
virtually no responsibility for their undocumented status.  In fact, one 
of the objective threshold requirements for DACA is that the appli-
                                                        
 132.  A state restriction can be a law, executive order, or any other form of state action 
that is subject to the Equal Protection Clause.  See supra note 28. 
 133.  See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See supra Part I.A.1. 
 135.  John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372–73 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136.  See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r of U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir. of 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., and John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigr. and Customs 
Enforcement (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (“By this 
memorandum, I am setting forth how, in the exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should enforce the Nation’s immigration laws 
against certain young people who were brought to this country as children and know only 
this country as home.”).  An argument could be made that DACA beneficiaries are similar-
ly situated to illegitimate children, a classification that has traditionally been afforded in-
termediate scrutiny.  See supra note 32. 
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cant must have entered the United States before age sixteen.137  A 
court analyzing an equal protection challenge of a state driver’s li-
cense restriction on DACA beneficiaries would likely make this com-
parison and, accordingly, apply intermediate scrutiny to the re-
striction. 
In addition, DACA beneficiaries are technically documented; 
they have provided ample documentation to the federal government 
to meet DACA eligibility requirements and, for this reason, are not 
subject to immediate deportation.138  Courts that have used rational 
basis review for driver’s license laws restricting undocumented immi-
grants were considering cases where the plaintiffs never submitted 
documentation to, nor were cleared by, the federal government.139  
Thus, DACA beneficiaries are different from the plaintiffs in those 
cases. 
Although there are obvious similarities between the Plyler plain-
tiffs and DACA beneficiaries, a court would likely emphasize the dif-
ferences between the benefit denied—a free basic education versus a 
driver’s license.  The Plyler Court equally focused on the innocent 
children harmed and the education they were denied, noting that 
“[t]he inestimable toll of that deprivation [of education] on the social 
economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individu-
al . . . ma[de] it most difficult to reconcile” an immigration status-
based denial of basic education with the equality guaranteed in the 
Equal Protection Clause.140  As the court articulated in Edgar, “the 
harm caused by the deprivation of a drivers license . . . pales in com-
parison to the extreme harm caused by the denial of a basic educa-
tion.”141  While this distinction may hold weight in theory, in reality, 
being unable to drive often translates into lack of access to better 
schools, better jobs, better health care, and even better grocery 
stores,142 especially in rural areas where public transportation is either 
                                                        
 137.  See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 138.  See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See supra Part I.A.1. 
 140.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982). 
 141.  Doe v. Edgar, No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91895, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989). 
 142.  See María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of 
Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 96–97 (2004) (asserting that because the 
automobile is “the most important mode of transportation in the United States, the lack of 
a driver’s license directly threatens [immigrants’] livelihood”); Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes 
or No Answer: A Plea to End the Oversimplification of the Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. & 
POL. 435, 448 (2008) (“[O]utside of a few metropolitan areas, it is difficult, if not impossi-
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inadequate or non-existent.143  In the end, those who are denied a 
driver’s license are also being denied access to better opportunities.144  
The negative impact of being denied a driver’s license therefore does 
not “pale in comparison” to being denied a basic education, but ra-
ther is indirectly similar. 
2.   Past State Interests in Denying Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented 
Immigrants Are Inapplicable to the Case of DACA Beneficiaries 
Most courts have consistently found legitimate state interests in 
denying driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants;145 these inter-
ests, however, do not apply to DACA beneficiaries.  For example, the 
courts in Doe No. 1 and Sanchez found that preventing “governmental 
machinery [from being] a facilitator for the concealment of illegal al-
iens” was a legitimate state interest.146  This interest is inapplicable to 
DACA beneficiaries because, by nature of having applied for deferred 
action status, they are not “concealed.”147  In fact, DACA operates as a 
mechanism to encourage individuals to identify and document them-
selves.148  Moreover, there would be no reason for a DACA beneficiary 
to attempt to conceal his identity when the federal government has 
already verified his identity through the application process.   
Similarly, the court in Cubas found “the assurance of the integrity 
of identification documents” was a legitimate state interest in that the 
challenged driver’s license law allowed the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles “to verify that the applicant is, in fact, who s/he purports to 
                                                        
ble, to function in the United States without a car. . . .  Prohibiting one from driving thus 
diminishes her ability to participate in everyday life.”). 
 143.  See Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 300–23 (2003) (discussing 
how those living in rural areas are isolated from better jobs, schools, and services, all of 
which is exacerbated by the lack of public transportation). 
 144.  See id. (highlighting the opportunities available to those not limited to rural are-
as); see also supra note 82. 
 145.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 146.  John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 
2001); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 818 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 147.  DACA applicants must provide ample documentation to USCIS to meet DACA 
eligibility criteria.  See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 148.  For a description of the major benefits of the DACA program, see supra text ac-
companying note 2.  See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text for a description of the 
DACA eligibility requirements. 
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be.”149  This reasoning, again, does not apply with full effect to DACA 
beneficiaries—not only because the federal government has verified 
their identity, but also because the federal government, through the 
Real ID Act, permits those with deferred action status to obtain a 
temporary driver’s license.150  Thus, there is little incentive for DACA 
beneficiaries to use false documentation to obtain a driver’s license 
when the federal government—the only entity that has the authority 
to remove them from the country—has granted them deferred action 
status. 
State interests in national security are likewise inapplicable to the 
case of DACA beneficiaries.  The courts in Cubas and LULAC I both 
found that the challenged driver’s license laws served a legitimate 
state interest in preventing acts of crime and terrorism.151  DACA ben-
eficiaries, by virtue of being granted deferred action status, have been 
characterized by the federal government as nonthreats to national se-
curity or public safety.152  Thus, denying them driver’s licenses for na-
tional security purposes is not a legitimate state interest when the fed-
eral government has already determined the individual poses no 
national security risk.153   
Finally, the courts in Doe No. 1 and Sanchez found that denying 
driver’s licenses to those subject to immediate deportation was a legit-
imate economic interest of the state.154  The main purpose of granting 
deferred action is to defer deportation;155 DACA beneficiaries, as long 
as they obey the law (just like any other noncitizen), are protected 
                                                        
 149.  Cubas v. Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 20, 24–25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007). 
 150.  Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(c)(2)(C). 
 151.  See Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (noting that preventing fraud and terrorist acts “serve 
a vital governmental purpose”); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC 
I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (suggesting that 
“making the state safe from crime and terrorism” provides a rational basis for Tennessee’s 
immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law). 
 152.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 153.  A court could follow the position of the court in Quiroga-Puma that denying driv-
er’s licenses to immigrants has nothing to do with national security, see supra text accom-
panying note 85, though this view seems to be rare.  
 154.  John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 
2001); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 818 (Iowa 2005). 
 155.  See DACA Initiative, supra note 1 (“Deferred action is a discretionary determina-
tion to defer removal action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
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from deportation.156  This state interest, therefore, also does not apply 
to DACA beneficiaries. 
Although there are persuasive arguments for the inapplicability 
of past state interests to the specific case of DACA beneficiaries, a 
court using rational basis review may still uphold a state driver’s li-
cense restriction on DACA beneficiaries because of the extreme def-
erence given to the state: state interests are deemed legitimate so long 
as a “state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”157  But, 
taking into consideration the similarities between DACA beneficiaries 
and the Plyler plaintiffs, and the differences between DACA benefi-
ciaries and the plaintiffs in past cases where the court used rational 
basis review, there are stronger arguments for the use of intermediate 
scrutiny.158 
B.  Pre-emption Arguments as Applied to DACA Beneficiaries 
Pre-emption arguments generally fail when they seek to maintain 
that states have no authority to promulgate immigrant-restrictive driv-
er’s license laws because the federal government has exclusive author-
ity over immigration.159  The Real ID Act, however, provides a promis-
ing foundation for a pre-emption argument in the case of state 
driver’s license restrictions on DACA beneficiaries.  Out of the three 
ways of finding pre-emption,160 only one is potentially viable.  There is 
no express pre-emption language in the Real ID Act, nor is the issu-
ance of driver’s licenses, unlike alien registration,161 a field in which 
Congress sought to regulate wholly since it made the Act voluntary.162  
That leaves conflict pre-emption. 
The first form of conflict pre-emption—physical impossibility—is 
inapplicable; given that state compliance with federal standards is not 
                                                        
 156.  See id. (stating that DACA beneficiaries’ cases “will not be placed into removal pro-
ceedings or removed from the United States for a period of two years, unless terminated” 
(emphasis added)). 
 157.  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
 158.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 159.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 160.  See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 161.  See supra note 95. 
 162.  See supra notes 90, 113 and accompanying text.  But see League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC II), No. 3:04–0613, 2005 WL 2034935, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 23, 2005) (holding that “Congress intended to preempt state law in this area of iden-
tity verification documentation for drivers’ licenses”). 
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mandatory, a resident of a state can have a non-compliant driver’s li-
cense and use another form of accepted identification, such as a pass-
port, for federal identification purposes.163  While this route is incon-
venient for residents of non-complying states,164 it is not physically im-
impossible to comply with state and federal law. 
The second form of conflict pre-emption—frustrates Congress’ 
objectives—provides a better argument.  In the Real ID Act itself, 
Congress recognized deferred action as a status in which one can get 
a temporary driver’s license.165  Congress also referred to those with 
deferred action status as having “authorized stay”—that is, lawful 
presence, in the United States.166  Thus, an argument can be made 
that Congress intended for persons with deferred action status to ob-
tain driver’s licenses, and states that deny driver’s licenses to DACA 
beneficiaries frustrate Congress’ objectives.   
Conversely, the Real ID Act was a promulgation of federal driv-
er’s license issuance standards in the name of national security;167 
while Congress’ intent in the Real ID Act to allow those with deferred 
action status to receive temporary driver’s licenses is fairly direct, the 
argument that denying driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries frus-
trates Congress’ national security objectives is fairly attenuated, espe-
cially given that compliance with the Act is voluntary.168  Moreover, 
traditional state functions, such as issuing driver’s licenses, are afford-
ed a presumption against pre-emption unless pre-emption was “the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”169  Nevertheless, USCIS’s re-
cent interpretation of “lawful presence” as it relates to DACA benefi-
                                                        
 163.  TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 19. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(c)(2)(C)(i). 
 166.  See id. § 202(c)(2)(C)(ii) (“A temporary driver’s license or temporary identifica-
tion card issued pursuant to this subparagraph shall be valid only during the period of 
time of the applicant’s authorized stay in the United States or, if there is no definite end to the 
period of authorized stay, a period of one year.” (emphasis added)). 
 167.  See TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 3 (explaining that provisions of the Real ID Act 
aimed to improve security).  
 168.  Cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505–07 (2012) (finding that section 
5(C) of S.B. 1070 “would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect 
to unauthorized employment of aliens,” and section 6 would fall under “no coherent un-
derstanding” of Congress’ intent for state officers’ cooperation with federal law in the ar-
rest of aliens). 
 169.  Id. at 2501 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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ciaries,170 along with its clarification on the lack of difference between 
“deferred action” and “deferred action for childhood arrivals,”171 
helps support the idea that Congress intended noncitizens such as 
DACA beneficiaries to be able to obtain temporary driver’s licenses, 
and state laws to the contrary should be pre-empted. 
C.  Policy Arguments for Allowing DACA Beneficiaries to Obtain Driver’s 
Licenses 
Perhaps the best arguments for why DACA beneficiaries should 
be able to obtain driver’s licenses are policy-based.  Parts II.C.1 and 
II.C.2 argue that increased public safety and reduced insurance costs, 
respectively, support the licensing of all qualified drivers, regardless of 
immigration status.  Both of these arguments apply with full force to 
DACA beneficiaries.  Part II.C.3 explains why the ability to drive is 
necessary to secure employment; this argument is especially pertinent 
to DACA beneficiaries since they are authorized and encouraged to 
work.  Beyond these safety, financial, and employment rationales lies 
pure politics.  After the 2012 presidential election, it is clear that mi-
nority voters, particularly Latinos, have a powerful voice in election 
outcomes.172  Although DACA beneficiaries do not have voting privi-
leges, U.S. citizens who support them do.  Thus, immigrant-friendly 
policies will likely translate to smart political moves post-2012. 
                                                        
 170.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 171.  See DACA FAQs, supra note 6 (“Deferred action for childhood arrivals is one form 
of deferred action.  The relief an individual receives pursuant to the deferred action for 
childhood arrivals process is identical for immigration purposes to the relief obtained by 
any person who receives deferred action as an act of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 172.  Latino Voters Showing Strong Turnout in Election 2012, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-06/politics/35505575_1_latino-voters-
hispanic-voter-turnout-mi-familia-vota; Elizabeth Llorente, Election 2012: Obama Wins Re-
Election, Clinches Latino Vote, FOX NEWS LATINO (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/11/06/election-2012-obama-wins-re-
election-after-clinching-ohio/; Jose Antonio Vargas, Viewpoint: The Power of the Asian and 
Latino Vote, TIME.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/11/08/viewpoint-the-
power-of-the-asian-and-latino-vote/; see also Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider Positions on 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A12 (“One of every 10 voters who cast ballots on 
Tuesday was a Latino, and they favored President Obama, with 71 percent of their votes, 
compared with 27 percent for Mitt Romney, forcing Republican leaders to wonder if they 
could ever regain the presidency without increasing their appeal to Hispanic Americans.”). 
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1.  Increased Licensing for All Qualified Drivers Increases Safety on 
the Roads 
The basic purpose for issuing driver’s licenses is to promote pub-
lic safety by ensuring competent drivers.173  Generally, to obtain a 
driver’s license, an applicant must pass a written test on the state’s 
driving rules, a road test, and often a vision test.174  According to the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the testing of 
drivers is “an effective highway safety tool.”175  Because of public safety 
concerns, many law enforcement officials have expressed support for 
increased licensing.176  For example, Rudy Landerso, Assistant Chief 
of Police in Austin, Texas, testified in 2003 in support of H.B. 396,177 a 
Texas bill that would have increased immigrants’ access to driver’s li-
censes: 
[W]e strongly believe it would be in the public interest to 
make available to these communities the ability to obtain a 
drivers license.  In allowing this community the opportunity 
to obtain drivers licenses, they will have to study our laws 
and pass a driver’s test that will make them not only in-
formed drivers but safe drivers.178 
                                                        
 173.  See ALBERT HARBERSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, LICENSED BY THE STATES 21 
(2002), http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/infra/sgn0208LicensedByTheStates. 
pdf (“Driver’s licenses were created for the purpose of protecting public safety by recog-
nizing those individuals who met the necessary standards . . . includ[ing] age, knowledge 
of traffic laws, physical capability to drive and practical driving competence.”).  
 174.  See Odegaard, supra note 142, at 446 (discussing driver’s license testing require-
ments); Spencer Garlick, Note, License to Drive: Pioneering a Compromise to Allow Undocument-
ed Immigrants Access to the Roads, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 191, 200 (2006) (same). 
 175.  Policy Positions of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, AM. ASS’N OF 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS 3, http://www.aamva.org/AAMVA-Policy-Positions/ (follow 
“Download the AAMVA Policy Positions” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2013); see also 
Garlick, supra note 174, at 200 (“Individuals with a driver’s license are likely to be better 
drivers than those without because access to driver’s licenses provides access to driver’s 
education, which provides knowledge of laws and public safety.”). 
 176.  See Driver’s Licenses for All Immigrants: Quotes from Law Enforcement, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. 
CTR. (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Quotes from Law Enforcement], http://v2011.nilc.org/ 
immspbs/DLs/DL_law_enfrcmnt_quotes_101404.pdf (quoting thirteen law enforcement 
officers from various states on the importance of licensing all drivers). 
 177.  H.B. 396, 77th Leg. (Tex. 2001) available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/billlookup 
/History.aspx?LegSess=77R&Bill=HB396. 
 178.  Quotes from Law Enforcement, supra note 176. 
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Many religious community members feel the same.179  In a letter 
to the California State Assembly in 2003, Elizabeth Sholes, Director of 
Public Policy at California Council of Churches, wrote: “Assuring that 
people who drive are qualified to do so will help diminish accidents 
and ensure higher standards of responsible behavior by those with 
motor vehicles.”180  After Illinois passed a bill that will allow undocu-
mented immigrants to receive temporary driver’s licenses,181 Governor 
Pat Quinn affirmed that “Illinois roads will be safer if we ensure every 
driver learns the rules of the road and is trained to drive safely.”182  
According to a DACA applicant from Michigan, allowing DACA bene-
ficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses “should be a peace of mind for the 
public.”183  Clearly, a broad spectrum of community members recog-
nizes that increased licensing will improve public safety for everyone 
else.  Accordingly, DACA beneficiaries should be able to obtain driv-
er’s licenses. 
2.  Insured Drivers Reduce Insurance Costs for Other Insured Drivers 
Each year, accidents caused by uninsured drivers cost more than 
$4.1 billion in insurance losses.184  Insured drivers must therefore pay 
higher premiums for accidents and injuries caused by uninsured driv-
                                                        
 179.  See Driver’s Licenses for All Immigrants: Quotes from Religious Organizations and Leaders, 
NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Dec. 2004), http://v2011.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/DLquotes_relig 
_leaders_120804.pdf (quoting ten religious leaders from various states on the importance 
of licensing all drivers). 
 180.  Id; see also Ben Poston, DMV Report Adds to License Debate, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/16/local/la-me-unlicensed-20130116 (dis-
cussing a recent study conducted by California’s Department of Motor Vehicles that found 
unlicensed California drivers to be three times more likely to cause a fatal crash as licensed 
drivers, and suggested that “merely meeting the modest requirements necessary to get a 
license . . . could improve road safety and help reduce the several thousand fatalities that 
occur in the state each year”). 
 181.  See supra note 112. 
 182.  Gustavo Valdes & Catherine E. Shoichet, Illinois Approves Driver’s Licenses for Undoc-
umented Immigrants, CNN (Jan. 8, 2013, 8:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/us/ 
illinois-immigrant-drivers-licenses/index.html. 
 183.  Interview 6 (Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with author); see also supra note 73. 
 184.  Fact Sheet: Why Denying Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented Immigrants Harms Public Safe-
ty and Makes Our Communities Less Secure, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. 2 & n.7 (Jan. 2008) [here-
inafter NILC Fact Sheet], http://v2011.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/FactSheet_DLs_2008-01-
16.pdf (citing a 2006 Insurance Research Council news release). 
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ers.185  Another argument underlying increased licensing is that it will 
increase the percentage of drivers who are insured, as many insurance 
companies require proof of a driver’s license before they will insure 
drivers;186 this increase will, in turn, reduce insurance costs for all 
drivers. 
Some states saw a dramatic decrease in the number of uninsured 
drivers soon after they implemented policies that allowed all qualified 
drivers to obtain driver’s licenses, regardless of their immigration sta-
tus.  For example, upon changing its law in 1999, Utah saw its unin-
sured driver rate drop from 10% in 1998 to 5.1% in 2007.187  Similarly, 
when New Mexico changed its law in 2003, the uninsured driver rate 
dropped from 33% in 2002 to 10.6% in 2007.188  When New York con-
sidered issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants, “the 
State Department of Insurance estimated that expanded license ac-
cess would reduce the premium costs associated with uninsured mo-
torist coverage by 34 percent,” in turn saving New York drivers $120 
million each year.189  Based on this empirical data, it is evident that in-
                                                        
 185.  See Stephanie K. Jones, Uninsured Drivers Travel Under the Radar, INS. J. (Aug. 18, 
2003), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/coverstory/2003/08/18/31590.htm 
(quoting Carolyn Gorman of the Insurance Information Institute: “The prices for unin-
sured motorist coverage are going up at a faster rate than any other part of the auto insur-
ance policy.  Everyone pays for it through higher premiums, because you have to insure 
yourself for an act that another person should be paying for.”); see also Garlick, supra note 
174, at 202–03 (“When an at-fault driver flees an accident or is uninsured, the not-at-fault 
driver must then turn to his own insurance company, which, after paying for damages, will 
often raise the premium for that driver.  Some insurance companies offer a no-fault insur-
ance policy to protect drivers who are involved in accidents with uninsured drivers, but 
again, such a policy raises costs for the ordinary driver.”). 
 186.  See Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of 
Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 220 (2004) (noting that “insurance companies generally 
require drivers to be licensed before they will insure them” and “[i]n most states, liability 
insurance must be established in order to register a motor vehicle”). 
 187.  NILC Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2.  Utah allows those who cannot prove lawful 
presence to obtain a Driving Privilege Card.  See supra note 112. 
 188.  NILC Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2.  According to a 2011 report from the Insur-
ance Research Council, however, New Mexico was among the top five states with the high-
est number of uninsured motorists in 2009 (26%).  INS. RES. COUNCIL, RECESSION MARKED 
BY BUMP IN UNINSURED MOTORISTS: IRC ANALYSIS FINDS ONE IN SEVEN DRIVERS ARE 
UNINSURED (2011), available at http://www.insuranceresearch.org/sites/default/files/ 
downloads/IRCUM2011_042111.pdf. 
 189.  Odegaard, supra note 142, at 445–46 & n.70; NILC Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2. 
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creasing access to driver’s licenses reduces the amount of uninsured 
drivers, in turn making accidents and insurance premiums less costly 
for other insured drivers.  For these reasons, DACA beneficiaries 
should be able to obtain driver’s licenses. 
3.  Having a Driver’s License Will Increase Employment 
Opportunities for DACA Beneficiaries 
In most parts of the United States, the ability to drive is necessary 
to obtain and maintain employment.190  In 2009, 76.1% of workers 
drove themselves to work.191  In only three locations did at least 10% 
of the workforce use public transportation to get to work,192 and in 
almost a third of the states, most notably in the South and Midwest, 
less than 1% of the workforce used public transportation.193  Thus, 
driving is often a necessity for employment in areas that do not have 
adequate mass transit systems.194  As more jobs are found in suburban 
areas, the negative effects of being denied a driver’s license are exac-
erbated for immigrants who settle in those areas and for those who 
commute from urban areas.195 
The fact that the federal government offers DACA beneficiaries 
work authorization is good reason to believe that it wants young im-
                                                        
 190.  Garlick, supra note 174, at 203. 
 191.  Transportation Statistics Annual Report, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS. 95 (2010) [here-
inafter TSAR 2010], http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/ 
transportation_statistics_annual_report/2010/pdf/entire.pdf; see also Most of Us Still Drive 
to Work—Alone, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 13, 2007), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/ 
releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/cb07-cn06.html (showing that 87.7% 
of Americans in 2005 drove to work and 4.7% used public transportation). 
 192.  See TSAR 2010, supra note 191, at 98 (providing a figure of the percentage of 
workers using public transportation in 2009).  The three locations were New York, District 
of Columbia, and New Jersey.  Id. 
 193.  Id.  Those states were Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Vermont.  Id. 
 194.  See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 195.  See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and 
the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 175 (2001) (“Due in large part to the suburbani-
zation of the American economy, inadequate transportation drastically limits the job pro-
spects of low-income individuals, especially those who live in inner-city neighborhoods.”); 
Pabón López, supra note 142, at 97 (providing examples of difficulties immigrants face 
when living in suburban or rural areas where driving to work is a necessity). 
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migrants to contribute to the economy.  According to a DACA appli-
cant from Maryland, the ability to work without the ability to drive is 
like “having only half of what’s promised.”196  After learning that 
Michigan announced it would not allow DACA beneficiaries to obtain 
driver’s licenses, a DACA applicant from Michigan questioned, “Why 
would we even apply for [DACA] if we can’t have a license?”197  By 
prohibiting DACA beneficiaries from obtaining driver’s licenses, 
states are limiting their employment prospects, especially if they live 
in areas with limited access to public transportation.198  A DACA ap-
plicant from Maryland explained that if she could not drive, she 
would have to get a job within walking distance from her house, and 
those do not pay well; but if she could drive, she explained, “I would 
have access to more jobs that would pay more.”199  An applicant from 
Michigan said, “Who is going to hire you if you have no form of 
transportation to get to work and back? . . .  It’s not like everybody 
lives next to their job.”200  Thus, granting DACA beneficiaries authori-
zation to work but denying them licenses to drive is counterproduc-
tive.  For this reason especially, DACA beneficiaries should be able to 
obtain driver’s licenses. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The new Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program has 
brought the debate over immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses into a 
new light.  The legal precedents in this field do not provide an en-
couraging framework for DACA beneficiaries.201  But, considering the 
similarities between DACA beneficiaries and the Plyler plaintiffs,202 and 
the differences between DACA beneficiaries and undocumented im-
migrants generally,203 it is likely that a state denying driver’s licenses to 
DACA beneficiaries will have a difficult time in court.  Both the legis-
                                                        
 196.  Interview 5 (Oct. 9, 2012) (on file with author). 
 197.  Interview 7 (Oct. 13, 2012) (on file with author). 
 198.  See Bassett, supra note 143, at 303–04 (noting that most rural areas offer mainly 
low-wage jobs because there are fewer job opportunities in industries that pay higher wag-
es). 
 199.  Interview 2 (Oct. 3, 2012) (on file with author). 
 200.  Interview 6 (Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with author). 
 201.  See supra Part I. 
 202.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 203.  See supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
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lature—through the Real ID Act204—and the executive—through the 
USCIS regulations205—help make this clear.  Fortunately, most states 
will not have to encounter any potential legal battles since they allow 
DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses.206  A close inquiry into 
the policy reasons for licensing DACA beneficiaries helps explain why 
these states made the right decision.207 
                                                        
 204.  See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text. 
 205.  See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text. 
 206.  See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
 207.  See supra Part II.C. 
